Abstract: Through his enduring efforts to interrogate the regulative ideals of fieldwork, George Marcus has empowered doctoral students in anthropology to rethink their ethnographic encounters in terms that reflect novel objects and contexts of inquiry. Marcus' work has culminated in a charter for ethnographic research among 'epistemic communities' that requires 'deferral' to these elite modes of knowing. For adherents to this programme of methodological reform, the deliberately staged 'para-site' -an opportunity for ethnographers and their 'epistemic partners' to reflect upon a shared intellectual purpose -is the signature fieldwork encounter. This paper draws on doctoral research carried out among the overlapping epistemic communities that comprise London's market for mining finance, and reviews an attempt to carve out a para-site of my own. Troubled by this experience, and by the ascendant style of deferent anthropology, I think through possibilities for more critical ethnographic research among epistemic elites.
Introduction:
In this article I engage with George Marcus' efforts to rethink the design of ethnographic fieldwork such that it keeps pace with changing objects of study in anthropology. I start by reviewing Marcus' evolving approach to what he calls the ethnographic mise-en-scène, or 'staging' of fieldwork. One of Marcus' key contributions has been his attention to the regulative ideals of fieldwork, or the disciplinary norms regulating ethnographic research, that take account of the cognitive and ethical implications of carrying out anthropological research at different moments in world history. I go on to review my own anthropological education and the regulative ideals I was exposed to as an undergraduate and taught postgraduate. Encapsulated in the notion that anthropologists are 'for the little guy' (Graeber 2002) , my internalization of these ideals made designing doctoral fieldwork to be carried among elites in London's mining market particularly challenging. To do so, I returned again to Marcus' later work on collaborative research in 'epistemic communities' -or communities of experts whose members are always already carrying out research. Despite my reservations regarding the notion that adequate and effective fieldwork carried out among contemporary epistemic elites should involve 'deferral' to their modes of knowing (Holmes and Marcus 2008) , I attempted to carve out space for exploring intellectual partnership with the members of one of the mining market's epistemic communities -what Marcus terms a 'para-site.' The productive, but hardly collaborative or deferent form that this para-sitic encounter took led me to question the viability of Marcus' agenda for the ethnographic exploration of 'harm industries' (Benson and Kirsch 2010) like mining, and I conclude by gesturing towards a slightly more provocative form that the ethnography of epistemic elites might take.
Becoming an Anthropologist (Article in press at Anthropology in Action)
Page 5 of 35 While George Marcus is perhaps best known as the primary proponent of 'multi-sited ethnography' (Marcus 1995) , his apparent advocacy for a globe-trotting anthropology was but one moment in a much broader project. The purpose of this has been to rethink the regulative ideals of fieldwork. Treating the fieldwork encounter as a mise-en-scène, Marcus has made it his business to diagnose and interrogate, for successive generations of anthropologists, the ethical and cognitive ideals that underprop ethnographic research. Thus Geertz's (1973) fabled account of gaining acceptance into his Balinese fieldsite describes the achievement of 'rapport' born out of complicity. Geertz's rapport with his ethnographic subjects arose from an incident during which he became, along with his erstwhile hosts, a fugitive from police intent on disrupting an illegal cockfight. Rapport of this type became, for those trained from the 1950s to 1980s, a key trope in anthropology's 'meta-method': the professional ideology that determines what might count as appropriate ethnography (Marcus 2001a; . Meta-method, for Marcus, has both ethical and cognitive dimensions. For Geertz's generation, rapport meant attaining 'insiderness', allowing the anthropologist to orchestrate the traditional mise-en-scène, and carry out fieldwork within a decidedly local, more-or-less hermetically sealed, setting (Marcus 1997) . For Marcus, a revolutionary shift in meta-method came with the recognition that anthropologists were complicit not only with those among whom they studied, but with powerful colonial and post-colonial agencies impacting upon their fieldsites. So, anthropologists were pressed to bring this world-historical context into their understanding of the fieldwork relation. This required that ethical alterations be made to the setting of the ethnographic stage -for instance, by incorporating an awareness of historical change into ethnographic writing. But only with multi-sited ethnography, that aimed to 'represent something of the [world] system itself' (Marcus 1989: 9) , could the cognitive implications of this recognition be fully incorporated into anthropology's meta-method, calling curtains once and for all on the traditional ethnographic mise-en-scène.
I will return to Marcus' work on multi-sited ethnography below. For now I wish to take up his interest in the regulative ideals of fieldwork (or 'meta-method') and explore how my own exposure to anthropology's professional lore, at three different British universities, coloured my efforts to design doctoral fieldwork, among the epistemic communities of London's mining market. Having been introduced to anthropology at Durham by outspoken proponents of 'indigenous knowledge in development' (Sillitoe 1998) and academics committed to working with grassroots sustainability projects in the vicinity of the university (Henfrey 2014), I moved to Kent, where my postgraduate studies were carried out under a similar sphere of influence (Ellen and Harris 2004) . My exposure to anthropology had certainly led me to believe that if nothing else, 'we are definitely not on the side of whomever, in a given situation, is or fancies themselves to be the elite' (Graeber 2002 (Graeber : 1223 . This was reflected in the conception of my first two research projects: on preparations for mine closure in Papua New Guinea (Gilbert 2012) , and on informal seed-saving networks in south-east England (Gilbert 2013 ). If we wanted to identify, using Marcus' terms, the 'meta-methodological' correlate of the politics that Graeber imputes to anthropology, we could look to Ernest Gellner's dictum that anthropologists in the middle of the twentieth-century were 'roughly liberals in their own society and Tories on behalf of the society they were investigating: they "understood" the tribesman but condemned the District Officer or the Missionary' (Gellner 1973: 29) .
i Gellner implied that in an effort to enact their loyalty to their ethnographic subjects, and disloyalty to elites 'at home' (and in order to sidestep accusations of ethnocentrism), mid-twentieth-century anthropologists would seek out the appropriate context in which to render the rituals and utterances they came across in the field both intelligible and (Article in press at Anthropology in Action) (Marcus 1999: 7) . This new kind of 'non-obvious' multi-sited ethnography would involve 'turning the traditional mise-en-scène inside out' (Marcus 1997: 101) . Thus the ethical adjustment to staging fieldwork that began with the recognition that anthropologists were complicit with powerful agencies that reshaped the fieldsites in which they studied was provided with its cognitive complement. It seemed I had found the perfect batten from which to suspend my proposed fieldwork design: I would carry out fieldwork among the epistemic elites of London's mining market -investigating how the functioning of the market for mining finance depended upon their imagination of a distant locale. In response to the frontier market frenzy gripping the mining market as I began my fieldwork,
and its unique extractive industry politics, Bangladesh (often designated a 'frontier' jurisdiction) became that second locale.
iii I would explore how participants in the mining market discussed, ranked and represented particular jurisdictions as sites of 'opportunity' or hazardous hotbeds of political risk, and how this affected the valuation of individual mining projects, as well as negotiations with sovereign states over mining licenses and royalties (Gilbert 2014; 2015a) . But there was a glitch. How could I reconcile this non-obvious multisited fieldwork, to be undertaken among the epistemic elites of London's mining market, with the anthropology in which I had been trained, and that demanded I not be on the side of those who fancy themselves to be the elite -especially elites 'at home'?
For the Little Guy
Given that the regulative ideals of ethnographic fieldwork were devised through engagement with those outside elite institutions, the fact that anthropology is often reliant upon 'toleranceengendering contextual interpretation' (Gellner 1973: 30) presents challenges for research 'temperamentally suited to be so clearly oppositional at the outset in relation to who they studied' (Marcus 1998 : 27 n. 9). Furthermore, mapping out the 'good' and 'bad' guys would dispense with the 'one trick' that anthropology has up its sleeve: a methodology based on 'the deliberate attempt to generate more data than the investigator is aware of at the time of collection' (Strathern 2004: 5) . And so, Marcus entreats non-obvious multi-sited ethnographers to 'pose the ambiguity and messiness of any moral position mapped onto social life across communities of difference' (Marcus 1998: 28 n. 9) . A willingness to embrace ambiguity has been a hallmark of recent writing on the regulative ideals of financial ethnography. Bill Maurer has argued that attacks on financial anthropologists who may, from certain perspectives, seem to have 'gone native' (e.g. Riles 2011) indicate nothing more than a failed critical imagination, according to which '"impurity" still means "danger"' (Maurer and Mainwaring 2012: 181) . At this point in my own preparation for fieldwork, I was starting to feel convinced: if rapport was the watchword of anthropology in Geertz's day, then ambiguity must be the foremost regulative ideal governing contemporary financial ethnography. Ambiguity I could live with. There may not be continuity with Gellner's tolerance-engendering contextual explanation, but an embrace of 'the messiness of the actual' (Cowan 2010: 104 ) did seem to run as a continuous thread connecting the anthropology in which I had been schooled, and the type of elite ethnography I was planning to conduct. The ritualized declarations of disloyalty, I supposed, could be put on ice for eighteen months, but at least I didn't have to 'take sides' during fieldwork. Ambiguity rules. another, Marcus argued for a reworking of the ethnographic mise-en-scène that frames the anthropologist and her ethnographic subjects as partners, sharing a common concern with a third 'elsewhere' (Marcus 2007) . Hence, multi-sited ethnography would by necessity come to be organised by a 'problem cognitively shared' (Marcus 2011: 23) once more experienced discomfort. Ambiguity I could live with, but this was one step further.
Deferral to elite modes of knowing? What could be further from the regulative ideals of away and get on with your day jobs.' As long as there is conversation, there is a contest over price. In closing she argued that 'shaping opinion' and 'getting truth' were one and the same -especially when you're 'looking at it from a broader societal view, as we have entered into this Age of Conversation.' I was fascinated. The notion that reputational risk arose from social media -the idea that 'everyone is a journalist' -was not, of course, novel, and I had and would encounter it many more times during my fieldwork -at London's Reputation
Institute, and at a masterclass for lawyers and PR professionals concerned with managing reputational risk. What was interesting was the notion of the Age of Conversation and Catherine's attitude towards valuation as a narrative process that could be 'secured' by establishing 'truth.' Catherine's idea that reputation was once managed from within a citadel, but now circulates more freely -but not without contest -in a networked world seemed to resonate with analytical perspectives I was using to make sense of other developments in the mining market, such as the decision to partner with a small company developing an algorithmic reputation analysis system that was made by the International Council on Mining and Metals. I had been thinking through Deleuze's (1992) notion of a society of control, which he offers as the successor to Foucault's (1991) disciplinary society. Whereas for Foucault, power operated via enclosure and the organizing power of the panopticon, in
Deleuze's control society, it is data management and network protocols that encode power.
There seemed to be clear resonances with Catherine's language of the citadel succeeded by the Age of Conversation. Clearly, hers was a vibrant epistemic community, committed to understanding emergent social forms. And so, I approached her and asked if we could meet.
To my delight, she not only agreed, she was enthusiastic -she made me feel like I had found an epistemic partner, and promised to organise a series of meetings with her and her firm's associates, in which we could engage over our apparently shared intellectual project: was earnestly attempting to prepare for my para-sitic encounter, unsure of quite how to do so in a non-confrontational way.
After being buzzed through even before I rang the bell to Catherine's unmarked building (I must have looked the part), I waited for her first in a waiting room -all clean lines and glass -and then upstairs in a room in which hung an original Picasso, and three surviving prints from a now incomplete series, produced by William Blake. 'Our chairman loves art!' I was told, when I commented upon them to Catherine and her two young associates. And I could not dispel the impression that in drawing attention to the artworks, I had violated what Miller (2005) terms 'the humility of things' -the taken-for-grantedness that is precisely what allows material culture to format our experience of space and social interaction -thus revealing the frailty of my efforts to perform as a member of this epistemic culture. But we sat down, and Catherine was friendly. One of her associates had recently left behind a career in investigative journalism, the other was trained in the UN system. We talked about the age of conversation, about the importance of maintaining and facilitating a conversation 'between companies and society'. Feeling bold, I asked about the recent events in Marikana (see Breckenridge 2012; James 2013), as I knew her firm to be dealing with the mining company which had employed the striking -and now dead -workers. This, she said, was a legacy
issue. All such events were 'legacy issues, bad decisions that were made 20 to 30 years ago, when there was no internet.' Remarkably, Catherine seemed to suggest that because of the disciplinary power of social media in the Age of Conversation, companies today could not be unethical. Thus, any 'social risk' arising at a mine site would necessarily be a legacy issue. moralists ' (Lincoln 1993: 142) . Like the anthropologist, the trickster dwells in ambiguity, in messy actuality -but also makes it their business to shake up fixed ideas, certainties and (Article in press at Anthropology in Action)
Page 21 of 35 apparent transparency. Is there not a place for trickster anthropology in the ethnography of epistemic elites? When Marcus developed the concept of the para-site it was part of a deliberate effort to escape from ethnographic encounters with the trickster subject of resistance studies, the cunning and 'wily transgressor within' (Marcus 2001b: 7) . We do not need to restrict our ethnographic encounters to engagements with these virtuously subversive subjects, but perhaps ethnographers studying epistemic elites could learn from them. Dwell in ambiguity during fieldwork, learn the folly of insisting on determinate meaning -but keep an eye on the big structural things, and, fieldwork complete, feel free to upset the efforts that are invariably made by your influential elite 'counterparts' to insist on determinate meanings of their own.
